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1. INTRODUCTION
People start carrying around more and more mobile de-
vices that can contain sensitive data. To protect these de-
vices, Desmedt et al. [1] proposed a threshold security archi-
tecture for Things That Think. In this architecture, secu-
rity is the result of the cooperation of at least the threshold
number of personal devices. Personal devices are devices
that are frequently in the user’s proximity and able to in-
teract with each other. For threshold security each personal
device possesses a share of the key material. When at least
the threshold number of these devices cooperate, this key
material can be used to, for instance place signatures or de-
crypt encrypted information. The advantages of deploying a
threshold cryptography scheme are : a user does not need all
his personal devices (e.g. dead battery, device left at home)
to access the necessary key material; an adversary does not
gain any knowledge of the key material when he does not
compromise the threshold number of devices.
For a threshold security architecture on Things That Think
to be practical, a mechanism allowing the user to add or re-
move devices from the set of personal devices is essential.
Refreshing key material enhances security. Adding a device,
removing a device and refreshing key material are essentially
the same in terms of the underlying protocol, resharing. One
example of a protocol for resharing can be found in [6].
However, little attention has been paid to the problem of
authorisation for resharing. Proper authorisation is neces-
sary to prevent an adversary from altering the set of per-
sonal devices in such a way that he would be able to break
the scheme. Moreover authorisation should not enable the
adversary to succeed in a Denial of Service (DoS) attack and
prevent the genuine user from signing and/or decrypting.
The authors developed a protocol to manually authorise
resharing in [4]. This paper focuses on the usability aspect
of this protocol, which was an essential part of development.
Although the proposed manual authorisation protocol is
studied in the context of resharing, it could also be used to
authorise signing and for bootstrapping.
An overview of related work on usability and pairing of
two devices is given by Saxena et al. [5].
2. MANUAL AUTHORISATION
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The user can manifest himself towards his personal devices
by entering/confirming his request at the threshold number
of personal devices. The resharing protocol, with parameters
as specified in the request, is triggered at each device after
collecting the threshold number of request approvals.
New information, in this case public keys, needs to be
authenticated by deploying a Group Message Authentica-
tion (GMA) [2] protocol. By visually comparing the Short
Authenticated Strings (SAS) the user ensures that the infor-
mation was exchanged between the intended devices.
2.1 User interactions
The user is provided with three options:
• add a device to the set of personal devices;
• remove a device from this set;
• refresh key material.
On a device that is not a personal device the user can initiate
adding this device to the set of personal devices.
After selecting one option his request is broadcasted to
all personal devices. When adding or removing a device,
the user selects the device from a list of discovered devices,
personal devices respectively.
The user than confirms his request at k of his personal
devices. It is recommended that the user visually checks his
request on the displays of his other personal devices before
confirming. The displayed request consist of the name of the
device that was used to enter the user’s request and the se-
lected option. If a device is added, the user is also requested
to compare the SAS resulting from the GMA protocol be-
tween that device and the personal devices.
When at least the threshold of devices have broadcasted
the user’s approval, all personal devices conclude that re-
sharing is authorised and resharing takes place. The per-
sonal devices indicate that the chosen option is in progress.
Upon successful resharing the devices indicate success.
3. USABILITY
We developed a web-based mock up interface, as depicted
in Fig. 1. The interface and user interactions were evalu-
ated by two experts in the field of Human Computer In-
terface (HCI) with no specific knowledge of the domain of
security system. Afterwards a preliminary study was con-
ducted among students from different backgrounds.
Figure 1: Web-based interface. Available on-line at
http://homes.esat.kuleuven.be/˜rpeeters/usability/
3.1 Expert evaluation
Although the interface is somewhat limited in the offered
functionality, the review indicated some potential usability
obstacles.
Match between system and the real world [3].
A significant usability problem was located at the very first
point-of-contact between the system and the user. People
with a security background might not be the typical end
users of the proposed security scheme. In this light, it is
undesirable to confront your end users with any technical
details about the algorithms behind the security system. To
explain the scheme, the reviewers rewrote system-oriented
terms, e.g., “threshold secret sharing”to match more familiar
concepts, e.g., “network of trusted devices”.
Explicit authorisation [7].
Users granting or removing authorisations to/from other ac-
tors must unambiguously know the consequences of their ac-
tions. On that account, many labels (buttons, titles, etc.)
have been revised, e.g., when adding a new device to the
threshold the button “next” has become “add” to prevent
users from assuming there will be another step in a wizard-
like setting.
3.2 Preliminary study
The most important thing for a user to successfully com-
plete a scenario is the ability to imagine a real-life use case.
Test subjects were provided with an interface having the op-
tion to do resharing (without adding or removing a device),
because most of them did not see any reason for doing this,
this option led to confusion. The redesigned interface ab-
stracted away from resharing and introduced refreshing key
material.
After authorisation, the display outputs that resharing is
in progress and ended successfully, as resharing is the under-
lying protocol that was authorised. This lead to confusion
among the test subjects who see the three options as three
distinct concepts. This also made clear that there should be
a clear distinction between the underlying protocol, reshar-
ing, and the provided options, of which one was resharing.
We abstracted away the underlying protocol and now display
that the selected option is in progress or ended successfully.
Removing a device was generally considered straightfor-
ward. Although test subjects were not allowed to use the
device that has to be removed to authorise the removal of
this device, half of them wanted to be able to start the au-
thorisation from this device.
The actions for adding a device used to consist of: a man-
ual authentication step between the new device and one of
the personal devices; a confirmation step on the threshold
number of personal devices; and finally a verification step on
the threshold number of personal devices. This clearly put
quite a high burden on the user. We redesigned the proto-
col for authorisation to make use of a group authentication
protocol. This allows to get rid of the verification step. The
user could only start adding a device from a personal de-
vice, but all test subjects wanted to be able to start from
the device to be added. We also learnt that the values for
a user to compare in the manual authentication step should
not be displayed in two groups, e.g. in two consecutive lines.
Some thought that they needed to compare these two values
instead of comparing the values across displays.
4. CONCLUSIONS
Adding a device, removing a device and refreshing key
material are three instances of resharing. However, users
think of these as three different concepts, and this should be
translated as such in the user interface. In terms of proto-
col design we learnt that: the protocol should allow to start
adding or removing a device from that device; authentica-
tion of new data needs to be integrated with authorisation
and should take place between all participating devices.
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